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ABSTRACT 
 “Averting risk in the face of large losses: Bernoulli vs. Tversky and Kahneman,” 
by Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Joaquim Silvestre. 
 
We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in 
choices involving high-probability losses. Indeed, our experimental participants tend to avoid fair 
risks for large (up to € 90), high-probability (80%) losses. Our research hinges on a novel 
experimental method designed to alleviate the house-money bias that pervades experiments with 
real (not hypothetical) loses.  
Our results vindicate Daniel Bernoulli’s view that risk aversion is the dominant attitude, 
But, contrary to the Bernoulli-inspired canonical expected utility theory, we do find frequent risk 
attraction for small amounts of money at stake.  
In any event, we attempt neither to test expected utility versus nonexpected utility theories, 
nor to contribute to the important literature that estimates value and weighting functions. The 
question that we ask is more basic, namely: do people display risk aversion when facing large 
losses, or large gains? And, at the risk of oversimplifying, our answer is yes.   
 
Keywords: Losses, Risk Attraction, Risk Aversion, Experiments, Prospect Theory, Bernoulli, 
Kahneman, Tversky. JEL Classification Numbers: C91, D81 
 
   2
“Averting risk in the face of large losses: Bernoulli vs. Tversky and Kahneman,”
 1 
 
by Antoni Bosch-Domènech,  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, CREA,
2  
and Joaquim Silvestre, 
University of California, Davis. 
 
This version: January 12, 2006 
 
1.  Introduction 
We question the assertion of Prospect Theory (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,1992) that 
people display risk attraction in choices involving high-probability losses. This assertion follows 
from two basic postulates of Prospect Theory, namely: 
(i)  The value function is strictly convex for losses; 
(ii)  People underweight high probabilities: this is the famous “inverted S” pattern of the 
probability weighting function.
3 
The two postulates reinforce each other for fair decisions involving losses when the probability of 
the loss is high, unambiguously implying risk attraction.
4 
But our experimental participants tend to avoid fair risks for large (up to € 90), high-
probability (80%) losses, directly challenging the assertion of Prospect Theory.  
Given the widespread acceptance of (i) and (ii) above, our result will no doubt be 
controversial.  We offer three arguments for the skeptics. First, our experimental method is novel. 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to Antonio Cabrales, José García-Montalvo, Fabrizio Germano, Robin Hogarth, Rosemarie Nagel, 
Albert Satorra and participants at a Universitat Pompeu Fabra Microeconomics Seminar for useful comments on an 
earlier version. We also thank Irina Cojuharenco, Elena Jarocinska, Martin Menner and Carlos Trujillo for assistance. 
Financial help by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under research project SEC2002-03403 is 
acknowledged by the first author, and by the University of California Faculty Research Grant by the second author. 
2 Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica de la Generalitat de Catalunya, aka “Barcelona Economics.” 
3 These postulates have been sustained by a large body of literature, initiated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which 
estimates value functions and probability weighting functions. See, for instance, Mohammed Abdellaoui (2000), 
Abdellaoui, Frank Vossmann and Martin Weber (2005), Colin Camerer and Tech-Hua Ho (1994), Nathalie Etchart-
Vincent (2004), Hein Fennema and Marcel van Assen (1999), Richard Gonzalez and George Wu (1999), Drazen 
Prelec (1998), Peter Wakker and Daniel Deneffe (1996), Wu and Gonzalez (1996, 1999), and  Wu et al. (2004). One 
of the few papers that question  the convexity of value function on the loss domain Moshe Levy and Haim Levy 
(2002). See William Harbaugh et al. (2002a, b) and Ralph Hertwig (2005) for results that do not verify the inverted-S 
shape of the probability weighting function.  
4 See Section 4.2 below.   3
Second, this surprising finding fits well with our less objectionable results, in the same experiment,  
on the role of probabilities, the amounts at stake, and gains on risk attitudes (aversion or 
attraction). Third, hints can be found in the literature indicating that decisions concerning large 
losses are more subtle than what (i) and (ii) imply. We expand on these three lines. 
First, much of the experimental support for the Tversky-Kahneman view that people are 
attracted to risk when facing high probability losses is based on introspection or on experiments 
with hypothetical money. Some support also comes from real-money experiments, although these 
results may be tainted by the house-money bias (see Section 2 below). Our experiment involves 
real money, but it follows a relatively complex procedure that we have designed in order to 
alleviate the house-money bias. On the basis of some indirect evidence, we believe that our method 
is to a significant extent successful in avoiding this pitfall. 
 Second, we find that the main determinant of risk attitude in a variety of decision tasks is 
the amount of money at stake. Our most striking result that the majority of decision makers display 
risk aversion for high-probability large losses accompanies our observations that:  
(a) This majority is larger when the probability of the loss is small (20%), as suggested by 
(ii) above;
5 
(b) The results for gains (Section 5 below) also a higher frequency of risk aversion as the 
probability of winning increases, in the direction implied by (i) and (ii) above; 
(c) The higher prevalence of risk aversion as the amount at stake increases can be seen as a 
manifestation of a general effect which is by now well established for real-money gains (Bosch-
Domènech and Silvestre, 1999, Charles Holt and Susan Loury, 2002, and Section 5 below). 
Third, the literature hints to the non-exceptionality of risk aversion when losses are large or 
ruinous. Etchart-Vincent (2004) finds that large (hypothetical) losses seem to generate some 
peculiar features, such as a larger proportion of concave utility functions, and less underweighting 
of large probabilities. And Dan Laughhunn et al. (1980) confirm that, in the face of a ruinous loss, 
a majority of business managers switches to risk aversion. In addition, the recent estimation of 
decision weights and value functions by Abdellaoui et al. (2005) fails to confirm the convexity of 
the value function on the loss domain: in their words, “For losses, no clear evidence in favor of 
convexity is observed.” (p.1398).
6 Finally, William Harbaugh et al. (2002a, b) observe an 
                                                 
5 Because the overweighting of low probabilities in (ii) favors risk aversion and may possibly neutralize (i). 
6 These results qualify the earlier ones in Abdellaoui (2000).     4
unconventional S-shaped probability weighting function. Interestingly, their subjects had to choose 
between a certain outcome and a gamble, which is precisely the method that we follow here, 
whereas a large fraction of the prior experimental work asked participants to choose between two 
gambles.
7 
In a sense, our results vindicate Daniel Bernoulli’s view that risk aversion is the dominant 
attitude, versus Kahneman and Tversky’s idea that people are attracted to risk when facing losses, 
particularly at high probabilities. But, contrary to the Bernoulli-inspired canonical expected utility 
theory, we do find frequent risk attraction for small amounts of money at stake.  
In any event, we attempt neither to test expected utility versus nonexpected utility theories, 
nor to contribute to the above-mentioned literature that estimates value and weighting functions. 
The question that we ask is more basic, namely: do people display risk aversion when facing large 
losses, or large gains? And, at the risk of oversimplifying, our answer is yes.   
 
2. An experimental design to alleviate the house-money bias 
The design of our loss treatments L and L’ (see Section 3 below) addresses a basic difficulty 
in real-money experiments with losses, namely the need for the experimenter and the participants to 
agree on their perceptions of what is a loss versus what is a gain.  
Since experimenters should not earn money from participants, any experiment with losses 
must involve either hypothetical losses or the provision of sufficient initial cash. Doubts have been 
raised about the reliability of the results from experiments with hypothetical losses (see Holt and 
Laury, 2002). But providing money to the participants has its pitfalls too. First, if participants do not 
earn the cash, then the cash provision will easily be interpreted as a windfall gain. And even if 
participants earn the necessary cash through their own skills and effort, they will still be playing with 
“house money.” There are grounds for suspecting that playing with windfall gains or house money 
increases risk attraction.
8 
Our loss treatments implement a design that we believe avoids to a large measure both the 
windfall-gains bias and the house-money bias. Each treatment consists of two temporally separated 
                                                 
7 We lack sufficient information to know whether it is this difference in design that yields diverging behavioral 
conclusions.    
8 See, e.g., Martin Weber and Heiko Zuchel (2001), Scott Boylan and Geoffrey Sprinkle (2001), Kevin Keasy and 
Philip Moon (1996) and Richard Thaler and Eric Johnson (1990). According to Thaler and Johnson (1990), p. 657, “… 
after a gain, subsequent losses that are smaller than the original gain can be integrated with the prior gain, mitigating 
the influence of loss-aversion and facilitating risk-seeking.” But see Jeremy Clark (2002) for small sums of money.   5
sessions: the quiz-taking session and the decision-making session. In order to alleviate the 
windfall-gains bias, in the first session the participants took a quiz on basic knowledge and earned 
cash -which was paid immediately after the quiz- according to the number of correct answers: €90 
to the participants ranked in the first quartile, €60 to the second one, €45 to the third quartile, while 
the bottom group received €30. They were then told that they would be called several months later 
for a second session where they could possibly lose money, and they signed a promise to show up. 
The exact date for the second session was left unspecified at that time.  
  Because we guarantee that the eventual losses would never exceed the cash previously 
received at time of the quiz, the participants could admittedly feel that they were playing with 
house money. But we hoped to reduce this bias by postponing the decision-making session until 
four months later and after a semester break  
Indirect evidence indicates that we mostly succeeded. The delay made a majority of 
participants feel by the time they made their decisions four months later that the previously earned 
cash had been integrated in their wealth and vanished in their everyday flow of expenditures.  In 
the decision-making session, and after registering their choices, but before running the random 
device, participants were ask to answer an anonymous questionnaire about the prospective pain of 
losing money in the experiment. Only a 21% claimed to anticipate no pain since the money “was 
not actually theirs.” The majority (e.g., 59% in Treatment L) agreed that it would be very painful to 
lose money because “the money was theirs,” 9% accepted that they would feel some pain since it 
was “as if the money was theirs,” 21% and 11% gave other answers. Post-experiment personal 
interviews showed similar results.
9 
 
3. Two experimental treatments involving losses 
                                                 
9 To further investigate the role of time lags in the perception of loss, we submitted a questionnaire to a group of 
students not involved in our experiments. The questions concerned hypothetical gains and losses, as well as various 
time lags.  
In one situation, a Mr. A and a Mr. B gained and lost the same amounts of money, but while Mr. A 
experienced the gain and the loss on the same day, Mr. B’s loss occurred several weeks later. Respondents were asked 
to compare the happiness of Mr. A. and Mr. B after losing the money. Of the 107 respondents, 71 considered Mr. A 
the happier one, whereas 27 thought it was Mr. B and 9 said that both were equally happy.  
In another situation, we asked to compare Mr. C, who won and lost some money on the same day, and Mr. D, 
who earned the difference between Mr. C’s gain and loss.  Most people (87 out of 107) viewed Mr. D as the happiest 
one. Taken at face value, the answers indicate that individuals feel more pain if a loss does not coincide in time with a 
gain, suggesting that their capability to integrate the loss with a previous gain is limited when time separates the 
moment of the gain from the moment of the loss, even when the loss and the gain are presented together as in the 
examples described.   6
All treatments in this paper share a basic design. Participants are voluntary students from the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra who have not taken courses in economics or business, and we try to 
maintain an equal proportion of sexes. Twenty-one participants took part in the decision-making 
session of Treatment L.
10  Participants were told that they would be randomly assigned, without 
replacement, to one of seven classes corresponding to seven possible money amounts to lose, namely 
€3, 6, 12, 30, 45, 60 and 90, with the proviso that a participant could not be assigned to a class with 
an amount of money to lose exceeding the cash earned four months earlier in the quiz. Then, a 
participant was asked to choose, for each of the possible classes and before knowing to which class 
she would eventually belong, between the certain loss of 0.2 times the money amount of the class 
and the uncertain prospect of losing the money amount of the class with probability 0.2 and nothing 
with probability 0.8. In what follows we say that a participant displays risk attraction (resp. risk 
aversion) in a particular choice if she chooses the uncertain (resp. certain) alternative.
11  
To record their decisions, participants were given a folder that contained one page for each 
money class. In each page, they were required to register, under no time constraint, their choice 
between the certain loss and the uncertain prospect. Participants were then called one by one to an 
office where the participant’s class was randomly drawn. Next, the experimenter and the 
participant checked in the participant’s folder (his or) her choice for that particular class. If her 
choice was the certain loss, she would pay 0.2 times the amount of money of her class. If, on the 
contrary, she chose the uncertain prospect, then a number from one to five was randomly drawn 
from an urn. If the number one was drawn, then the participant would pay the amount of money of 
her class. Otherwise, she would pay nothing. Some of the participants who lost money paid their 
losses on the spot, while the remaining ones, who had often incurred heavy losses, paid within a 
few days. We are happy to report that all of them ended up paying.  
The experimental data are presented in Table A1 of Appendix 1. 
Treatment L’ was performed with thirty-four students.
12 The treatment had exactly the same 
format as Treatment L, except that the probability of the loss was now a hefty 0.8, instead of 0.2. The 
                                                 
10 We personally contacted every one of the twenty-four subjects who had taken the quiz and had collected the cash 
four months earlier to inform them on the date, hour and venue of the decision-making session. Remarkably, twenty-
one of them did show up. The male/female ratio ended up being 10/11. 
11 A risk-neutral participant could choose either the certain or the uncertain prospect, his or her choice being at 
random. But the likelihood that the results of our experiments consist of random variation is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
12 Thirty-six participants had taken the quiz, but two did not show up for the second part of the L’ experiment. The 
final male/female ratio was 18/16.   7
experimental data are displayed in Table A2 of Appendix 1. Because of the higher probability, the 
average loss was now higher than in Treatment L. Yet once more all losers paid their losses. 
  
4. Risk aversion for large losses  
4.1. Our data 
Table 1 presents, for each amount of money that a participant could lose, the fraction of participants 
who displayed risk attraction by chosing the uncertain loss alternative. Taking one row at a time, we 
observe an unmistakable decrease in the frequency of risk attraction as the amount of the possible 
loss grows larger, proving that the amount of money at risk is a major factor in determining the risk 
attitude. This was already observed in experiments involving non-hypothetical gains (Bosch-
Domènech and Silvestre, 1999, Holt and Susan Loury, 2002), and in the classical field study of Hans 
Binswanger (1980). Together with the evidence presented in Section 5 below, we find that the 
amount effect, defined as the increase in the frequency of risk-averse choices as the amount of 
money at stake increases, is robust, and it applies both to gains and to losses. 
 
4.2. Comparison with the real-money literature 
The experimental literature on losses deals mostly with hypothetical money amounts, and 
occasionally with real money just received from the experimenter and thus subject to the house-
money bias (often on top of a windfall-gain bias). Therefore, no comparison between our results and 
the previous ones is straightforward. The comparison is also more problematic for papers that, while 
using real money, aim at objectives different from ours, such as Mikhail Myagkov and Charles Plott 
(1997), who test the predictions of Prospect Theory in a purely market context, John Dickhaut et al. 
(2003), who study the neurophysiological processes behind choice behavior, Peter Brooks and Horst 
Zank (2005), who test for loss aversion and gain seeking behavior, and Charles Mason et al. (2005), 
who test for departures from expected utility maximization.  
  Robin Hogarth and Hillel Einhorn (1990), and Laury and Holt (2000) do directly test risk 
attitudes in the face of real-money losses, but they deal with amounts of money not exceeding $10, 
where they find a lower frequency of risk attraction than we do for those amounts. However, in 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) a majority of participants display risk attraction for the very low loss of 
$0.10. Interestingly, the real-money experiments in Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) display an amount 
effect similar to ours: risk aversion becomes more frequent as the amount of money that can be lost   8
increases (although the scales are different: from $0.10 to $10 in Hogarth and Einhorn, versus €3 to 
€90 for us).  
  
  Amount of Money 
     €3      €6     €12     €30     €45     €60      €90 
Treatment L 





   0.71 
 
   0.62 
 
    0.29 
 
    0.23 
    
 
    0.27 
    
 
    0.33 
    
Treatment L´ 





   0.97 
 
   0.71 
 
   0.47 
 
    0.50 
   
 
    0.35 
    
 
    0.37 
 
 
Table 1. Fraction of participants, in Treatments L and L´, who display risk attraction (by choosing the 
uncertain alternative) for the various possible amounts of the loss. The color red highlights a majority 
of participants displaying risk attraction. The color green, a majority displaying risk aversion. 
 
4.3. Comparison with the hypothetical-money literature 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) conduct experiments with both real and hypothetical money, and the 
amount effect that they observe in the real-money treatments vanishes in the hypothetical treatments. 
This lack of amount effect in the hypothetical-money setting is actually replicated by Etchart-
Vincent (2004), whose results are reproduced in the second row of Table 2. They may be compared 
with the last row of Table 2, which summarizes some of our data from Table 1, and shows the 
powerful effect of the amount of the loss.
13  Particularly striking are the differences at the two ends 
of the rows.  
 
  
                                                 
13 The last row of Table 2 is constructed as follows. 
First column: 0.73 is the average of the three entries in the first row and columns 1-3 (which cover the loss 
amounts €3, €6 and €12) of Table 1. 
Second column: 0.30 is the average of the two entries in the first row and columns 6 and 7 (which cover the 
loss amounts €60 and €90) of Table 1. 
Third column: 0.86 is the average of the three entries in the second row and columns 1-3 (which cover the 
loss amounts €3, 6 and 12) of Table 1. 
Fourth column: 0.36 is the average of the two entries in the second row and columns 6 and 7 (which cover the 
loss amounts €60 and €90) of Table 1. 
   9
 
 
  Low Probability of Loss  High Probability of Loss 
 
 





                   0.20 
 








      Small 
(around $1190) 
    Hyp. Loss, 
    Prob. < 0.1 
 
       0.20 
      Large 
(around $13,310) 
    Hyp. Loss,  
     Prob. < 0.1 
 
      0.18 
      Small 
(around $1190) 
    Hyp. Loss, 
    Prob. > 0.5 
  
        0.65 
    Large 
(around $13,310) 
    Hyp. Loss,  
    Prob. > 0.5 
 










      Small 
(around €7) 
    Real Loss, 
   Prob. = 0.2 
 
      0.73 
 
    Large 
(around €75) 
    Real Loss, 
   Prob. = 0.2 
 
     0.30 
     Small 
(around €7) 
    Real Loss, 
   Prob. = 0.8 
 
      0.86 
     Large 
(around €75) 
    Real Loss 
    Prob. = 0.8 
 
      0.36 
 
Table 2. Fraction of participants who display risk attraction in various articles. Again, the color red 
highlights a majority of participants displaying risk attraction, whereas the color green, a majority 
displaying risk aversion. 
 
For small losses with low probabilities (first column), a majority (73%) of our participants 
display risk attraction, whereas few (20%) of Etchart-Vincent do. (Her figures for low-probability 
losses in fact agree with those in the pioneering work by Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, reported in the 
first row of Table 2.) This, admittedly huge difference should nevertheless be qualified on at least two 
grounds. First, how small is a small loss? For us, “small” means around seven (real) euros, whereas, 
for Etchart-Vincent, “small” means close to twelve hundred (hypothetical) dollars. The pattern, which 
we observe, of decreasing frequency of risk attraction as the amount at stake increases implies that, to 
the extent that twelve hundred hypothetical dollars “translates” into an amount of real euros higher 
than seven, the percentage of risk-attracted choices for that larger real amount would be lower than 
73%, in the direction of Etchart-Vincent’s figure. Second, how low is a low probability? For us, it is 
0.2, whereas for Etchart-Vincent it does not exceed 0.1. A lower probability of the loss will tend to 
decrease, ceteris paribus, the frequency of risk attraction (see, e.g., our Table 1 as well as the second 
row of Table 2), which may partially explain why Etchart-Vincent’s frequency of risk attraction at low 
probability is lower than ours.    10
  In any event, the high proportion (73%) of risk taking for small amounts of low-probability 
losses that we observe fills a data gap not covered in the previous literature, and for this data range, 
it yields a quite novel observation. While empirically new, the observation does not contradict 
Prospect Theory if one assumes that the overweighting of the 0.2 probability is not too strong 
relative to the convexity of the value function on the loss domain. 
  Going back to Table 2, we observe that the entries for high probabilities display a certain 
symmetry with those for the low probabilities. The most striking instance appears in the last column, 
where the majority (64%) of our participants display risk aversion for the high probability (0.8) of a 
large loss (real €75 on average). This sharply contrasts with Etchart-Vincent’s majority (56%) of risk 
attraction for her large losses (hypothetical $13,310). More significantly, our result directly 
challenges the usual account of Prospect Theory, with a convex value function in the loss domain, 
and with underweighting of high probabilities, which, as stated in the introduction, unambiguously 
predicts risk attraction in the face of high-probability losses.
14  
  Interestingly, while for large losses our result disagrees with the hypothetical large-loss 
frequency of Etchart-Vincent, our small-loss, high-probability figure of 86% is indistinguishable 
from the 87% of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) (right half of first row of Table 2), and not too far 
from the 65% reported by Etchart-Vincent.  
  Notice that, for the top two rows (hypothetical losses) of Table 2, the figures for low 
probability are quite similar (20%, 20% and 18%), while very different from those for high 
probability (87%, 65% and 56%). On the other hand, within each probability range, the amount 
matters less (20% vs. 18%, and 65% vs. 56%). The opposite pattern appears in our experiment: the 
figures in the last Row of Table 2 are similar for low- and high-probability small losses (73% vs. 
86%), or for low- and high-probability large losses (30% vs. 36%). The bottom line is that, when we 
try to understand behavior confronting losses, the explanatory power of the amount of money 
dominates that of the probability, whereas the probabilities provide the best organizing principle for 
the pattern observed by those who adopt the hypothetical-money method.  
 
5. Risk attitudes in the face of gains 
                                                 
14 Proof. Let the loss-domain value function v
-(z) be strictly convex, with v
-(0) = 0 and v
-(z) < 0 for z < 0, and let the 
weighting function w
-(p) satisfy w
-(p) < p, for high p. Then, for z < 0, v
-(pz) < pv




-(z) for high p, i.e., v
-(pz) < w
-(p) v
-(z), implying that the decision maker prefers to lose ⎮z⎮ with probability p (and 
nothing with probability 1 – p) to losing ⎮pz⎮  for sure, hence displaying risk attraction in than choice.  
   11
In order to check the robustness of our experimental design, we contrast our loss treatments L and L’ 
with similar treatments, labeled G and G’, that involve gains in the seven money classes €3, 6, 12, 
30, 45, 60 and 90, reported in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (2002). A participant in Treatment G 
was asked to choose, for each of the seven money classes and before knowing to which class she 
would eventually belong, between the certain gain of 0.8 times the money amount of the class and 
the uncertain prospect giving the money amount of the class with probability 0.8 and nothing with 
probability 0.2. Treatment G’ was identical to Treatment G, except that the probability of the 
uncertain gain was now 0.2, instead of 0.8.  Table 3 adds to Table 1 above two new rows with the 
frequencies of risk attraction in G and G’. 
 
 Amount  of  Money 
     €3      €6     €12     €30     €45     €60      €90 
Treatment G  
(gains with prob. = 0.8) 




   0.57 
 
   0.29 
 
   0.05 
 
    0.10 
 
    0.10 
 
    0.05 
Treatment L 





   0.71 
 
   0.62 
 
    0.29 
 
    0.23 
    
 
    0.27 
    
 
    0.33 
    
Treatment G´  
(gains with prob. = 0.2) 




   0.92 
 
   0.79 
 
   0.46 
 
    0.50 
 
    0.17 
 
    0.17 
Treatment L´ 





   0.97 
 
   0.71 
 
   0.47 
 
    0.50 
   
 
    0.35 
    
 
    0.37 
 
 
Table 3. Fraction of participants, in Treatments G, L, G´ and L´, who display risk attraction (by 
choosing the uncertain alternative) for the various amounts of money a stake. The color red highlights 
a majority of participants displaying risk attraction. The color green, a majority displaying risk 
aversion.   12
Recall that our uncoventional result is the one expressed by the four last entries of the last row of 
Table 3, namely the low frequency of risk-attracted choices when facing high-probability, large 
losses: this is our direct challenge to Prospect Theory. Yet these cells do not appear out of place in 
Table 3: they extend to high-probability large losses the more familiar pattern of risk aversion that 
we find for low-probability, large losses (row 2), for high-probability large gains (row 1) and for 
low-probability large gains (row 3). Notice also that the frequencies of risk attraction of the last row 
of Table 3, for large amounts, are low, yet higher than the figures corresponding to the remaining 
rows of the table. Hence, our observations agree with the often-reported increase in the frequency of 
risk attraction when moving either from gains to losses, or from low- to high-probability losses. 
In addition, recall from Section 4.3 above that Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) found an 
amount effect for real-money losses (as we do), but not for losses in hypothetical money (which is 
reproduced by Etchart-Vincent, 2004). Gains display exactly the same pattern.
15 Hogarth and 
Einhorn (1990), Holt and Laury (2002, 2005), and Glenn Harrison et al. (2005) find an amount 
effect when the gains are real, but not when they are hypothetical. That an effect of such relevance 
and magnitude vanishes as experiments turn to hypothetical money points towards the need of 
caution when adopting the hypothetical-money method. 
Note also that we ask participants simply to choose between a binary lottery and a certain 
outcome. This is less convoluted than asking participants to reveal their willingness to pay for a 
lottery, as it has been often done in previous experiments. And the two procedures may well elicit 
significantly different risk attitudes, as discovered by the preference-reversal literature that Paul 
Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein (1968) initiated. 
Finally, we addressed the concern that our participants could perhaps integrate the various 
choices required from them, and try to balance safer with riskier decisions. Accordingly, we 
statistically checked for the type of “embedding bias” that would occur if the choice made for a 
particular amount of money varied as the decision was embedded in a set of four, five, six or seven 
decisions. The statistical test, reported in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (2006b), did not rule out 
the immunity of our procedure to embedding bias. 
 
                                                 
15 Classical studies using electroencephalography (EEG) provide a thought-provoking parallel to our amount effect. It 
turns out that the stimuli provided by the outcomes of monetary gambles elicit a slow-wave response in the brain, 
labeled P300, which increases in amplitude with the amount of money won or lost. Interestingly, its amplitude does not 
vary depending on whether the subject encounters gains or losses (see S. Sutton et al. 1978, V. S. Johnston 1979, but 
also the qualifications reported in Nick Yeung and Alan Sanfey, 2004).   13
6. Conclusions 
We focus on risk attitudes in the face of money losses. Historically, the oldest of the three main 
views on money risk attitudes is that of Bernoulli, 1738, which sees most people as risk averse 
most of the time. By positing a fundamental gain-loss asymmetry, Kahneman and Tversky 
subverted in 1979 this then dominant wisdom, advancing the view that risk attraction is the norm 
for losses, whereas risk aversion is the norm for gains. Later developments added a role for 
probabilities, leading Tversky and Kahneman in 1992 to propose a fourfold pattern, with risk 
aversion in either high-probability gains or low-probability losses, and risk attraction for low-
probability gains or high-probability losses.   
We introduce a third factor, namely the amount of the loss, while designing a new method 
to alleviate the “house money” bias that pervades real-money experiments with losses. Much of the 
previous experimental evidence of risk taking in the face of losses is confined either to 
hypothetical losses or the loss of small amounts, limitations that our experimental design avoids. 
A main result is that, contrary to the recent views, and as Bernoulli thought, risk aversion is 
the majority attitude when substantial amounts of money can be lost. This parallels the pattern that 
we have observed for gains. To paraphrase Kahneman and Tversky, the relevant distinction 
appears to be, not between the domains of gains vs. losses, as they claim, but between the domains 
of large vs. small money amounts.  
The thrust towards risk aversion for large amounts and towards risk attraction for small 
amounts does not conflict with the four-fold pattern of Prospect Theory for decisions involving 
either gains or low-probability losses. But risk aversion in the face of high-probability, large losses 
raises a major challenge to Prospect Theory. Yet this is precisely what we observe in a range of 
data not directly covered by previous experiments. It leads us to conclude that, when it matters, 
most people display risk aversion.  
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Appendix 1. Experimental data 
 
  
 Amount  of  Money  (Euros) 
                   3                  6                  12                  30                  45                  60                     90
Participant AL  c c  c  c  c  c  c 
Participant BL  c c  c  c - - - 
Participant CL  un c  c  c  c  c - 
Participant DL  un c  c  c  c - - 
Participant EL  un un  c  c  c - - 
Participant FL  un un  c  c - - - 
Participant GL  un un  c  c - - - 
Participant HL  un un  un c  c  c  c 
Participant IL  un un  un c  c  c - 
Participant JL  un un  un c  c  c - 
Participant KL  un un  un c  c - - 
Participant LL  un un  un c  c - - 
Participant ML  un un  un c  c - - 
Participant NL  un un  un c - - - 
Participant OL  un un  un un un -  - 
Participant PL  un un  un un un  un - 
Participant QL  un un  un un un  un  un
Participant RL  c c  c  un un  c - 
Participant SL  un c  un un c  c  c 
Participant TL  un un  un c  c  c  un
Participant UL  un un  un un c  un  c 
 
Table A1. Treatment L. A letter c (green cell) indicates choosing the certain loss (thus displaying 
risk aversion), while the letters un (red cell) indicate choosing the uncertain loss (thus displaying risk 
attraction).  The dashes indicate that the participant was not asked to make the corresponding choice.   15
   
  Amount of Money (Euros) 
  3  6  12 30 45 60 90 
Participant AL'  un  c  c  c  c - - 
Participant BL'  un  un  c  c - - - 
Participant CL'  un  un  c  c - - - 
Participant DL'  un  un  c  c - - - 
Participant EL'  un  un  c  c  c - - 
Participant FL'  un  un  c  c  c  c - 
Participant GL'  un  un  c  c  c  c  c 
Participant HL'  un  un  c  c  c  c  c 
Participant IL'  un  un  un  c - - - 
Participant JL'  un  un  un  c - - - 
Participant KL'  un  un  un  c  c - - 
Participant LL'  un  un  un  c  c - - 
Participant ML'  un  un  un  c  c  c - 
Participant NL'  un  un  un  c  c  c - 
Participant OL'  un  un  un  c  c  c - 
Participant PL'  un  un  un  c  c  c  c 
Participant QL'  un  un  un  un  - - - 
Participant RL'  un  un  un  un  c  c - 
Participant SL'  un  un  un  un  un -  - 
Participant TL'  un  un  un  un  un -  - 
Participant UL'  un  un  un  un  un -  - 
Participant VL'  un  un  un  un  un  c - 
Participant WL'  un  un  un  un  un  c - 
Participant XL'  un  un  un  un  un  c  c 
Participant YL'  un  un  un  un  un  un - 
Participant ZL'  un  un  un  un  un  un - 
Participant AAL'  un  un  un  un  un  un  c 
Participant BBL'  un  un  un  un  un  un  un 
Participant CCL'  un  un  un  un  un  un  un 
Participant DDL'  un  un  un  un  un  un  un 
Participant EEL'  c  un  un  c - - - 
Participant FFL'  un  un  c  un  c - - 
Participant GGL'  c  un  c  c  un -  - 
Participant HHL'  c  un  un  un  - - - 
 
 
Table A2. Treatment L´. A letter c (green cell) indicates choosing the certain gain (thus displaying 
risk aversion), while the letters un (red cell) indicate choosing the uncertain gain (thus displaying 
risk attraction).   16
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